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Using a  data set  that covers all Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 
1979-2005,  this  study  performs  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  economic  determinants  of 
Mayors’ choice to run for another term. The literature on the subject is mainly centered on the 
United States and, as far as we know, no papers are found addressing the economic factors of 
this choice. 
Probit panel estimations show that local economic conditions matter more than the 
national or regional economic environment. The results also confirm that political variables 
are important and that they influence the likelihood of seeking reelection in the same way as 
they affect vote and popularity functions. 
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1.  Introduction 
This article investigates the determinants of Portuguese Mayors’ decision to run for 
another term in office with a special emphasis on the impact of economic conditions. The 
literature on the influence of economic conditions on electoral results and on popularity of 
politicians is quite extensive. Since the seminal papers of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), 
Kramer  (1971)  and  Mueller  (1970)  numerous  studies  have  showed  that  voters  judge 
democratic  governments  by  how  well  they  manage  the  economy.  Some  general  and 
encompassing surveys on this literature are presented by Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) 
and Paldam (2004). The Portuguese case – with particular interest for this study – has also 
been under the scope of some papers by Veiga and Veiga (2004, 2010). However, as far as 
we know, there are no  papers focusing on the economic determinants of the choice of 
running  for  another  term  in  office.  Furthermore,  the  literature  found  on  the  subject  is 
mainly  centered  on  the  United  States  (U.S.)  and  generally  explores  the  dynamics  of 
political ambition and politicians’ career management.
1 This article tries to fill this gap in 
the literature by performing an empirical analysis of the choice of running for office in 
Portuguese  local  elections  using  an  extensive  data  set  that  covers  all  mainland 
municipalities for the period 1979-2005. 
The Portuguese case constitutes an excellent laboratory for this analysis for some 
reasons. First, election dates are fixed and defined exogenously from the perspective of 
local authorities. Second, all municipalities have elections on the same day. Third, there are 
no reelection institutional constrains because there is no legal limit on the number of terms 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Black (1972) and Fox and Lawless (2005).  
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in office during the time span considered in this study.
2 Finally, local incumbents have a 
key influence in local policy and outcomes. 
The results provided by this study are quite interesting. First, they show that  local 
economic conditions matter more for Mayors’ decision than national or regional economic 
environment. Second, they confirm the idea that Mayors try to influence the local economic 
environment and electoral outcomes by increasing expenditures before elections. Finally, 
the size of the municipality, the time in local government and the age of the Mayors were 
found to be relevant predictors of the decision to seek reelection. 
The article is organized as follows. The Section 2 reviews the literature and discusses 
the reelection decision. Section 3 presents a short tour on some aspects of Portuguese local 
elections.  Section  4  describes  the  model  and  dataset  used.  The  panel  data  results  are 
presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review and some aspects on the reelection decision 
A rational choice perspective for the decision to run for office was presented by 
Schlesinger (1966). In his framework, potential candidates are more likely to seek office 
when  political  and  structural  conditions  are  favourable.  Therefore,  the  development  of 
one’s political career is based on the maximization of the likelihood of attaining higher 
office or at least retaining a current position. 
When seeking any elective position or deciding to run for higher office, politicians 
consider the number of open seats available, term limit requirements, levels of legislative 
professionalization,  party  support  among  constituents,  among  other  factors.  Broad 
                                                 
2 In 2005 the Portuguese parliament issued a law limiting the number of terms to three. However, it will only 
have a real impact in the 2013 local elections as the count started for all Mayors in the 2005 elections.  
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empirical evidence studying political ambition, career management and the decision to run 
for higher office is found mainly for the U.S.
3 
This study analyses the Portuguese case where the democratic design is very different 
from the one found in the U.S. and uses a framework that links the decision to run for office 
with economic voting theories and empirical evidence. In the literature, personality effects 
are  found  to  be  relevant  in  explaining  vote  and  popularity,  indicating  that   different 
candidates provide different electoral outcomes .
4 However, we  know from the political 
cycles’  studies  that  politicians  (or  political  parties)  also  tend  to  behave  in  ways  that 
maximize their chances of winning elections.
5 Therefore, perceptions of electoral success 
affect their strategies, including the Mayor’s choice between retirement or not. In Portugal, 
Mayors cannot be forced to retire by the party they represent. The ultimate decision is 
theirs, as they can seek reelection with or without party support. However, party preference 
for a new candidate should increase as the winning chances of the current Mayor decrease. 
For the political career of politicians in office, not running may be viewed as better 
than losing, although this is not generally true for parties. The more likelihood a Mayor 
thinks he has of losing the forthcoming election, the higher will the probability of deciding 
not to run for another term be. Moreover, some studies that analyse U.S. congress members 
conclude  that  when  the  electoral  margin  decreases,  member’s  probability  of  seeking 
reelection also decreases (Moore and Hibbing, 1998; Theriault, 1998). Although age and 
the prospect of a better position are examples of other potential explanatory factors, some 
of the variables typically included in vote studies may well be relevant in the reelection 
function. The number of consecutive terms in office may reduce the chances of reelection, 
                                                 
3 See, among others, Black (1972), Kazee (1994), Goodliffe (2001), Stone and Maisel (2003) and Fox and 
Lawless (2005). 
4 See, for example, the seminal work  of Frey and Schneider (1978) for the U.S. and Lanoue and Headrick 
(1994) for Great Britain. 
5 Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977).  
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as it has a negative impact on government vote shares. In particular, evidence of popularity 
erosion over time in office was already documented in a seminal paper by Mueller (1970).
6 
The economy is another dimension that affects incumbent’s electoral fortune. For 
Portugal, Veiga and Veiga (2004, 2010) find evidence of a reward/punishment mechanism 
related to the economic performance. Due to the nature of their job, we should expect 
Mayors to have a solid knowledge of the economy and its mechanisms. Hence, good local 
economic performance should increase Mayor’s general sense of efficacy as a candidate. 
This means that prior to voters’ electoral judgment and keeping all other factors constant, 
more competent office holders should have an increased probability of seeking reelection. 
In our paper we test both national and local economic conditions, because results found in 
the voting literature that examines local elections are mixed regarding their importance. For 
example, Atkeson and Partin (1995), Hansen (1999), Squire and Fastnow (1994) highlight 
the importance of the regional economy, while Peltzman (1987), Kone and Winters (1993), 
Remmer and Gélineau (2003) and Belanger and Gélineau (2004) find evidence in favor of 
the importance of national, not subnational, economic conditions. 
 
3.  Brief characterization of Portuguese Municipal elections 
On 25th April 1974 democracy was re-established in Portugal, ending a 48 years 
period of dictatorship. The phase of considerable political instability that followed (with 6 
provisional governments) only ended in 1976 when a new Constitution was approved and 
the  first  legislative  elections  took  place.  The  Constitution  formally  established  the 
Portuguese Municipalities and in December of 1976 the first local elections were held. All 
                                                 
6 Veiga and Veiga (2004, 2010) also report the existence of costs of ruling for Portuguese governments.  
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the following elections took place in December, except the last one, which was held in 
October 2009.
7 
In each municipality there is a Town/City Council and a Municipal Assembly. The 
first has the executive power: it elaborates and implements local policies. The second is a 
deliberative branch that approves the overall framework of local policies. 
The members of the Town Council and a portion of the Municipal Assembly are 
elected directly by the voters registered in the municipality. The remaining seats in the 
Assembly are reserved to the presidents of the councils of the  Freguesias
8 that belong to 
the municipality. 
These three bodies of governance serve a four year term and local residents are 
called upon to vote for party or independent lists presented for each of them in the same 
day.  The  outcome  is  determined,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  D’Hondt  method  of 
transforming votes into mandates. 
In  Portuguese  municipal  elections  the  candidates  running  for  Mayor  assume  a 
leading role in campaigns and they are at least as important as the party that supports them, 
meaning that different candidates may provide different electoral outcomes. The candidate 
that achieves the highest number of votes will be empowered as Mayor. Besides presiding 
the Town Council meetings, he has a key role in the municipal government: he assigns 
tasks  to  the  other  Town  Council  members,  manages  human  resources,  contracts 
authorization,  licenses  and,  in  accordance  with  the  general  policy  framework,  chooses 
which projects to implement and their timetable. 
Portuguese local governments, being the Mayor the principal decision maker, are 
responsible for territory organization, social and economic development and are also in 
                                                 
7 Election years were: 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005. 
8 Freguesias are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal. The president and council members are elected 
directly by the voters living in the area. Each municipality is comprised of a variable number of freguesias.  
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charge of supplying local public goods such as water, transportation, housing, healthcare, 
education and culture.
9 
Their wide range of intervention makes them responsible for the well -being of the 
population that lives in the municipality. The fact that they are of substantial importance in 
local economic activity, potentially ties the municipal government’s electoral fortune to the 
economic environment. 
Until the 2005 Municipal elections, Mayors could run for another term without any 
legal limit on the number of the terms in office. Hence, some were in office since the first 
elections held in December 1976. This perpetuation of the time in office generated some 
discussions after the 2005 election that ultimately led to the imposition of a three term limit 
to every municipal office holder. Thus, the period between 1976 and 2005 represents an 
interesting and unique case for studying the reasons why Mayors run for another term in 
office. 
 
4.  Data and model specification 
In order to analyse the Portuguese case, we collected data for the 278 mainland 
municipalities over the period 1979-2005, covering 8 electoral periods. 
The dependent variable (Recand) is a variable that takes value 1 when a Mayor is 
running for another term in office. Several economic, political, and individual variables are 
used as regressors in this analysis. A complete description of all the variables employed in 
this study can be found in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
                                                 
9 Law 159/99 of the Portuguese Republic defines the areas of intervention of Portuguese local governments.  
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The effects of the economic environment on the likelihood of a Mayor running for 
another term are controlled for at three levels: national, regional (NUTS III level) and local 
(Municipal level).
10 This disaggregation will permit to check whether they are giving more 
relevance to local than national or regional economic conditions or not. To characterize the 
national economic environment, we use the three variables that have received the greatest 
empirical attention in the vote literature: unemployment rate, inflation and GDP growth.
11 
One should expect adverse economic conditions to have a negative impact on the decision 
of a Mayor run to another term.  The unemployment rate was obtained from the OECD’s 
Main Economic Indicators while the inflation rate and GDP were acquired from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. 
At the regional level there is no data for inflation, and GDP per capita is used 
instead of national GDP. The GDP per capita (NUTS III) and the regional unemployment 
rate (NUTS III) were obtained from the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
The regional (NUTS III) unemployment rate was available only for 1991 and from 1999 
onwards thus reducing time variability and the number of observations. To overcome this 
difficulty, we estimated a proxy of the unemployment rate for the remaining years of the 
1990’s using the multiple imputation algorithm developed by Honaker and King (2010). 
At the local (or Municipal) level there are no time series data collected for GDP, 
inflation  or  unemployment  rate,  therefore,  we  use  some  proxies  for  the  economic 
conditions. As a measure of municipal income, we use the Marktest’s Purchasing Power 
Index (PPI) that reflects municipalities’ wealth. Data on the number of employees in firms 
(Employ) and the average municipal wage (Wages) are also used. These variables were 
                                                 
10 NUTS is a geocode standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes, used 
within the European Union. In Portugal, a hierarchy of three NUTS levels is established. Continental Portugal 
correspond to a NUTS I region,  which is subdivided into 5 NUTS II regions. These 5 regions are then 
subdivided into 28 sub regions (NUTS III), each one comprised of several municipalities. 
11 See Paldam (2004) for a survey on vote studies.  
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collected from the “Quadros de Pessoal” database of the Portuguese Ministry of Labour 
and Social Solidarity (MTSS)
12 and are available since 1985. 
The municipal expenditures are another factor that can influence the  reelection 
decision. To collect this effect we included in the model the variables total expenditures per 
capita  (TotExpd)  and  capital  expenditures  per  capita  (CapExpd).  As  Veiga  and  Veiga 
(2007a) found strong evidence of political budgetary cycles in Portuguese municipalities, 
we expect that an increase in expenditures is likely to improve the chances of running for 
another term. 
The dimension of the  municipality can  also  be  an issue to  consider in  Mayor’s 
decision to re-run. Hence, we introduce as regressor the log of the local population (LnPop) 
to capture that effect.
13 
The model also includes a set of political variables and individual characteristics of 
the candidate  that were  obtained from the Technical Staff for Ma tters Concerning the 
Electoral Process (STAPE).
14 We include a measure for the number of consecutive terms in 
office (TLGov).  Given  the  ample  evidence  of  the  costs  of  ruling  found  in  the  voting 
literature, we expect a  negative sign for the  coefficient  on  TLGov. To control  for past 
electoral support and as an indicator of good governance conditions, we include a dummy 
for  local  majority  governments  (MajGov).  Another  political  indicator  used  is  SGov:  a 
dummy variable equaling 1 when a local government is controlled by the party that holds 
power at the national level. Mayors with political ties to the ruling national party may not 
run for another term, simply because they can be offered a better position in the national 
government or parliament. Also, their probability to seek reelection may decrease if the 
                                                 
12 This is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers almost all privately owned firms employing paid 
labour in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included). 
13 Data on Municipal accounts and population were obtained from the local authority’s (Direcção Geral das 
Autarquias Locais - DGAL) annual publication called Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). 
14 The data for the dependent variable (Recand) were also obtained through this source.  
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popularity of the national government is low, as there may be some spillover effects that 
decrease their chances of reelection. 
To  capture  individual  characteristics  we  introduce  four  variables:  Age,  Gender 
(Male), education (Degree) and residency in the municipality. Data on these variables is 
only  available  from  1997  onwards.  Hence,  they  are  only  included  in  some  of  the 
estimations because of their reduced time span. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study are reported in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
As  the  dependent  variable  used  in  this  analysis  is  binary,  the  model  chosen  to 
estimate the coefficients of interest is a probit model. This model describes the probability 
of an event occurring given certain conditionings. In particular, it will be used to explain 
the probability of a Mayor running for another term in office, given certain determinants 
(x). Mathematically, this model can be represented as follows:
15 
, ) ' ( ) | 1 ( Prob β x x    recand             (1) 
where β is the vector of parameters to be estimated and  ) ' ( β x  is the normal cumulative 
distribution function. The vector of parameters β reflects the impact of changes in x on the 
probability of a Mayor running for another term. 
As the probit model is estimated for a panel of municipalities over several elections, 
a panel data analysis should be considered. The application of binary models to panel data 
analysis is straightforward. The structural model for a panel data can be written as follows: 
otherwise.   0   and    , 0    if    1




   
it it
i it it it
y recand
T t n i y  β x
          (2) 
                                                 
15 For details on this binary choice model see, for example, Greene (2008, Ch. 23).  
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In this case, y
* is an unobserved outcome and εit is an error term. Regarding the 
assumptions made over the error term, we can have: (i) a random effects model, where 
i it it u     and υit and ui are independent random variables, ui has mean 0 and variance 
equal to 
2
u   and υit is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance  1
2    ; (ii) a fixed 
effects model, where  it i it it d       and dit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
individual i in period t, and 0 otherwise; (iii) or a model with no individual or random 
effects (pooling). 
The selection of the best estimation procedure was made based on the usual Wald 
test for fixed effects and an LR test for random effects. Fixed effects and random effects 
were always rejected in the regressions considered in this study.
16 Therefore, we decided to 
estimate  a  simple  pooled  probit ,  where  the  presence  of  heteroscedasticity  and 
autocorrelation is controlled for using robust standard errors. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
The results from the estimation of the pooled probit model are presented in Tables 3 
and 4. Table 3 reports the results where national and regional economic variables are used. 
Alongside with NUTS III economic variables, we introduce the capital expenditures of the 
municipality in order to control for local economic activity. No local variable was used 
when testing for national economic effects to avoid a substantial loss of observations. Table 
4 considers estimations with local economic variables only.
17 In order to determine  the 
relevant time horizon of  Mayors, we expressed the economic  variables in two different 
ways:  first,  as   percentage  changes  from  the  previous  year;  and   second,  as  average 
                                                 
16 The results of those tests are available upon request. 
17 In this study, we test national, regional and local economic conditions, because, as mentioned in Section 2, 
results found in the voting literature are mixed regarding their importance.  
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percentage annual changes over the entire term (since the previous election year).
18 It is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  Mayors  have  a  good  knowledge  of  the  economy  and  are 
sophisticated decision  makers,  therefore  it  is expectable  that  they  do  not  focus  their 
attention exclusively on the recent past. However, the assumption of myopic behaviour is 
coherent with the objective of winning elections. Mayors may restrict their analyses of the 
economy to the short run in their decision process simply because they  assume voters are 
myopic. Veiga and Veiga (2004, 2010) find a dominance of retrospective and myopic 
characteristics in the Portuguese electorate. 
For each variable presented in tables 3 and 4, it is shown the estimated coefficients 
and  the  respective  average  marginal  effects.  The  z-statistics  for  both  the  estimated 
coefficients and respective average marginal effects are presented in parentheses and the 
degree of statistical significance is signalled with asterisks. The number of observations, 
log-likelihood, Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) and McFadden’s Pseudo-
R
2 are reported at the foot of the table. 
Analysing the results at the national and regional level reported in Table 3, we find that 
both the national  and  the regional  economic environment  are not  very  relevant  for the 
Mayors’  decision  to  seek  reelection.  As  they  do  not  control  these  major  levels  of 
macroeconomic policy, theoretically those should not affect their chances of reelection. 
However,  we  found  that  the  short  run  national  inflation  rate  has  some  impact  on  the 
decision: the higher the national inflation rate is, the lower is the likelihood of Mayors 
running for another term. We think that this may be related to some degree of potential 
accountability. The national inflation is generally taken as a benchmark for price increases 
in some public goods that are provided by the municipality, such as public transportation, 
healthcare, education and water. Even though circumstances beyond the Mayor’s control 
                                                 
18  See  Veiga  and  Veiga  (2010)  for  a  similar  approach  on the  study  of  the  impact  of  local  and  national 
economic conditions on legislative election results.  
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may  force  him  to  raise  the  prices  of  local  public  goods  the  decision  is  ultimately  his. 
Additionally voters may attribute these higher prices to direct policy decisions emanating 
from the local government, thus affecting the Mayor’s chances of reelection. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
We should notice that there is only one economic variable that has a significant 
impact  on  Mayor’s  decision:  local  capital  expenditures.  When  capital  expenditures 
increase, the probability to run for another term in office also increases. By increasing 
expenditures,  the  Mayor  is  somehow  giving  a  sign  of  his/her  intention  of  seeking 
reelection, since he/she is trying to improve local economic conditions in order to increase 
his/her chances  of being reelected. This  result  corroborates Veiga and  Veiga’s  (2007b) 
findings for Portugal showing the existence of a political payoff to opportunist spending at 
the local level. 
The size of the municipality and political variables are also found to be relevant in 
explaining  Mayor’s  decision.  There  is  some  evidence  that  the  likelihood  of  a  Mayor 
running for another term is higher in municipalities with more population, maybe because 
this gives them more visibility and power. Moreover, their wages are indexed to the number 
of voters. 
The results show that when a Mayor belongs to the party that leads the national 
government,  the  likelihood  to  run  for  another  term  in  office  decreases.  One  possible 
explanation might be that this scenario increases the probability of being offered a better 
position in the national government. However, we suspect that the negative effect is more 
related  to  a  mechanism  of  political  accountability.  Being  affiliated  with  the  national 
government may expose the Mayor to spillover effects coming from the party’s popularity.  
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The  number  of  consecutive  terms  in  office  also  affects  the  dependent  variable 
greatly. For each additional term, the likelihood of running for another term decreases about 
2 percentage points. Nevertheless, if the Mayor’s party has a majoritarian position in the 
Town Council, the probability of running for another term in office increases about 6 to 8.5 
percentage  points.  This  means  that  if  they  have  a  strong  electoral  support  and  good 
conditions to govern, the likelihood of running for another term increases significantly. 
These two results are well in line with the findings on the related literature: Mueller (1970), 
Moore and Hibbing (1998), Theriault (1998) and Veiga and Veiga (2004, 2010). 
Table 4 presents the results for the estimations strictly with local variables. Due to 
the lack of data at the local level for the economic variables presented in Table 3, we use 
some proxies for the Municipal economic conditions, like the Purchasing Power Index, 
wages and employment. Contrary to the evidence obtained in the national and especially in 
the regional regressions, the local economic environment seems to matter for the Mayor’s 
decision. This means that only the economic variables over which the Mayor exerts some 
control  are  important.  An  improvement  in  the  Municipal  Purchasing  Power  Index  is 
relevant for the Mayor’s decision. An increase in Municipal real wages is also statistically 
significant  but only  when we consider an overall assessment of the entire term. These 
results seem to indicate that adverse local economic conditions reduce the likelihood of 
seeking reelection, probably because they decrease the Mayor’s chances of winning. 
Similarly to the national and regional unemployment rate, the effects of municipal 
employment  on  the  likelihood  of  a  Mayor  running  for  another  term  in  office  are  not 
relevant. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
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An important conclusion of this analysis is that the national economic environment 
is less important for Mayor’s decision than the local economic conditions. Mayors may 
look  at  national  inflation,  but  we  found  no  evidence  regarding  the  national  GDP  or 
unemployment. They are more concerned with Municipal income, which was here proxied 
by  the  purchasing  power  and  wages.  Therefore,  the  expectation  that  improvements  in 
municipal economy help the local government to get more votes generates an incentive for 
the Mayor to take part in the elections. 
At the same time, he/she also tries to influence the local economic environment by 
increasing  expenditures  before  elections.  In  that  sense,  our  results  show  that  total 
expenditures and capital expenditures are important factors: an increase in these variables 
increases the likelihood of running for another term. In fact, increases in expenditures make 
clearer the Mayor’s intention of running again  for office, because improvements in the 
municipal economy generated by more expenditure (especially capital expenditures) may 
improve the Mayor’s electoral support, therefore, increasing his odds at the ballots
19. 
Regarding  the  political  variables  included  before  in  the  national  and  regional 
estimations, only the coefficient on the time in local government remains highly significant 
and with the expected sign. This can be due to the loss of  a significant number of  
observations, which  affects the power of the tests.
20  Moreover, the  coefficient on the 
population variable for the  importance of the municipality is only marginally significant, 
but it remains with the expected sign. 
The individual characteristics were included  here to control directly for personal 
specificities of the  Mayor that could affect his/her decision of running for another term. 
                                                 
19 Due to potential problems of endogeneity related to municipal budgetary variables we estimated an IV-
Probit with proper instruments, but post estimation tests did not reject the exogeneity hypothesis. 
20 We also included the percentage of vote s in the previous election in the regressions instead of (and with) 
MajGov. There were no significant changes found in the estimations. Furthermore, the coefficient on that 
variable generally proved to be statistically insignificant.  
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Only the age of the candidate is found to be relevant: for each year of age, the probability of 
re-running decreases about 0.7 percentage points. This makes sense, since we expect that 
older Mayors will have a lower propensity to run for another term. We also tested the 
hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between the dependent variable and age but found no 
empirical support for this specification. 
Regarding gender, degree and residence, no significant evidence was found. We 
should point out that the capital expenditures were included in both regressions with and 
without personal characteristics, and that we have found no significant differences between 
the results. 
We  also  estimated  a  conditional  logit  model  controlling  for  fixed  effects  and  a 
probit model assuming random effects, but the results were quite similar not affecting the 
conclusions of this study.
21 As mentioned above, the tests to select  the best estimation 
procedure always rejected fixed and random effects. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the determinants of Portuguese Mayors’ decision to run for 
another term in office with a special emphasis on the impact of economic conditions. The 
literature on the influence of economic conditions on electoral results is quite extensive, but 
no papers are found on the economic determinants of the choice of running for another term 
in  office.  This  study  tries  to  fill  this  gap  in  the  literature  by  performing  an  empirical 
analysis of the choice of re-running for office in Portuguese local elections. 
Estimating a panel probit model over a data set that covers all Portuguese mainland 
municipalities  for  the  period  1979-2005,  we  reached  important  conclusions  that  may 
represent interesting contributions to the understanding of how democracy works. A first 
                                                 
21 Those results are available upon request.  
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and important conclusion of this analysis is the fact that the local economic conditions 
matter  more  for  the  Mayor’s  decision  to  seek  reelection  than  the  national  or  regional 
economic environment. Although the national inflation is found to be significant, this may 
be due to the particular effects it has on the local economy.  
The  expectation  that  improvements  in  municipal  economy  help  the  local 
government  to  get  more  votes  generates  an  incentive  for  Mayors  to  seek  reelection. 
Moreover,  our  results  also  show  that  they  may  be  influencing  the  local  economic 
environment by increasing expenditures before elections, which helps them to get more 
electoral support for the next election. 
We found evidence that Mayors’ relevant economic time horizon is not restricted to 
the recent past. Our analysis shows that, although Mayors tend to put a significant weight 
on  short  run  economic  conditions,  they  also  look  at  the  average  local  economic 
performance over term. Therefore, Mayors tend to be more sophisticated decision makers 
than the myopic Portuguese voters reported by Veiga and Veiga (2010). 
We found political variables to be especially important predictors. We used a set of 
political  variables  traditionally  included  in  vote  studies.  The  results  confirm  their 
importance and that they affect the likelihood of seeking reelection in the same way they 
impact vote and popularity functions. This reinforces the notion that reelection choices are 
significantly related with the expectations regarding electoral results. 
As to the variables that are used to capture the personal characteristics, only the 
Mayor’s age proved to be statistically significant. Concerning the significant negative effect 
of both age and time in local government on the likelihood of a Mayor seeking reelection, 
we have reasons to suspect for the presence of positive duration dependence in Mayor’s 
incumbency. This appears to be the case, because our study seems to indicate that  the 
likelihood of a Mayor leaving the office tends to increase over time. However, a more  
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careful  assessment  of  this  conjecture  needs  to  be  done  employing  a  proper  duration 
analysis.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Description of the variables 
Variables  Description 
Dependent variable   




- National   
UR  Percentage change in the national unemployment rate
+ 
GDP  Real GDP growth rate
+ 




UR  Percentage change in the regional (NUTS) unemployment rate
+ 




PPI  Change in the Municipal Purchasing Power Index (in percentage)
+ 
Wages  Change in Municipal real wages (in percentage)
+ 
Employ  Change in Municipal employment (in percentage)
+ 
TotExpd  Real total expenditure per capita (Municipal – in thousands of Euros) 
CapExpd  Real capital expenditure per capita (Municipal – in thousands of Euros) 
- Control 
 
LnPop  Logarithm of the population living in each Portuguese municipality 
SGov  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the local and national governments are 
of the same party, and 0 otherwise 
TLGov  Time in local government, i.e. number of terms in office 
MajGov  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the Mayor’s party has a majority 
Age  Age of the Mayor running for another term 
Male  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the Mayor is male, and 0 otherwise 
Degree  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the Mayor has a university degree, and 
0 otherwise 
Residence  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the Mayor lives in the municipality 
where he or she was elected, and 0 otherwise 
Sources: Sources: Main Economic Indicators (OECD); IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF); 
Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE); Marktest;  Finanças Municipais (Municipal 
Finances  -  DGAL);  Quadros  de  Pessoal  (database  of  the  Portuguese  Ministry  of  Labour); 
Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (STAPE). 
Notes: 
+ percentage change from the previous year and average percentage change over term. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
Dependent variable           
Recand  2115  0.80  0.40  0  1 
Independent variables 
         
- National           
UR (annual)  2224  3.46  12.56  -11.47  31.39 
UR (term)  1946  1.30  10.03  -13.14  17.01 
GDP (annual)  2224  2.76  2.53  -2.04  6.44 
GDP (term)  1946  2.64  1.85  0.25  6.11 
Inflation (annual)  2224  11.74  8.56  2.16  23.54 
Inflation (term)  1946  10.70  7.95  2.87  24.54 
- Regional 
         
UR (annual)  1112  0.51  1.01  -2.67  2.83 
UR (term)  834  1.35  3.62  -9.02  7.26 
GDP_pc (annual)  1112  8.77  2.76  4.23  20.17 
GDP_pc (term)  1112  8.50  2.67  4.16  19.89 
- Local 
         
PPI (annual)  828  4.61  7.30  -30.00  69.17 
PPI (term)  825  2.28  2.89  -13.84  21.23 
Wages (annual)  1381  0.46  5.17  -41.11  21.24 
Wages (term)  1378  2.13  2.48  -8.20  11.09 
Employ (annual)  1351  8.39  15.44  -52.21  148.76 
Employ (term)  1348  5.74  6.89  -11.97  57.62 
TotExpd  2118  469.60  326.12  23.43  2315.27 
CapExpd  2118  248.38  181.69  16.37  1589.33 
- Control 
         
LnPop  2206  9.84  1.01  7.50  13.60 
SGov  2223  0.42  0.49  0  1 
TLGov  2203  2.80  1.92  1  8 
MajGov  2223  0.75  0.43  0  1 
Age  795  51.63  7.33  31  76 
Male  805  0.96  0.19  0  1 
Degree  825  0.50  0.50  0  1 
Residence  801  0.91  0.28  0  1 
Sources: See Table 1. 
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Table 3. Regressions with national and regional variables: Pooled probit 
  Percentage changes from the previous year  Average percentage changes over term 
  National  Regional  National  Regional 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
UR  -0.0013    0.0507    0.0022    0.0155   
  (-0.49)    (1.15)    (0.66)    (1.11)   
  -0.0004    0.0133    0.0006    0.0040   
  (-0.49)    (1.15)    (0.66)    (1.11)   
GDP    -0.0164        -0.0284     
    (-1.19)        (-1.59)     
    -0.0045        -0.0073     
    (-1.19)        (-1.59)     
GDP_pc        0.0090        0.0104 
        (0.49)        (0.55) 
        0.0024        0.0027 
        (0.49)        (0.55) 
Inflation  -0.0116**  -0.0093**      0.0020  0.0005     
  (-2.55)  (-2.02)      (0.45)  (0.10)     
  -0.0032**  -0.0025**      0.0005  0.0001     
  (-2.56)  (-2.03)      (0.45)  (0.10)     
CapExpd      0.0012***  0.0011***      0.0013***  0.0011*** 
      (3.52)  (3.27)      (3.30)  (3.25) 
      0.0003***  0.0003***      0.0003***  0.0003*** 
      (3.59)  (3.31)      (3.36)  (3.29) 
LnPop  -0.0400  -0.0397  0.1328**  0.1169**  -0.0341  -0.0347  0.1000  0.1151** 
  (-1.27)  (-1.25)  (2.33)  (2.02)  (-1.05)  (-1.07)  (1.42)  (1.98) 
  -0.0109  -0.0108  0.0349**  0.0308**  -0.0088  -0.0089  0.0256  0.0303** 
  (-1.27)  (-1.25)  (2.36)  (2.04)  (-1.05)  (-1.06)  (1.43)  (1.99) 
SGov  -0.1615**  -0.1571**  -0.1802*  -0.1708*  -0.1982***  -0.1950***  -0.1715  -0.1704* 
  (-2.48)  (-2.45)  (-1.95)  (-1.83)  (-2.71)  (-2.67)  (-1.58)  (-1.83) 
  -0.0441**  -0.0429**  -0.0474**  -0.0450*  -0.0510***  -0.0500***  -0.0438  -0.0449* 
  (-2.50)  (-2.47)  (-1.97)  (-1.85)  (-2.75)  (-2.71)  (-1.60)  (-1.85) 
TLGov  -0.0650***  -0.0656***  -0.0971***  -0.0977***  -0.0781***  -0.0799***  -0.0785***  -0.0977*** 
  (-3.64)  (-3.68)  (-5.20)  (-5.19)  (-4.39)  (-4.48)  (-3.70)  (-5.20) 
  -0.0177***  -0.0179***  -0.0255***  -0.0257***  -0.0201***  -0.0205***  -0.0201***  -0.0257*** 
  (-3.69)  (-3.73)  (-5.40)  (-5.40)  (-4.48)  (-4.57)  (-3.81)  (-5.41) 
MajGov  0.3252***  0.3257***  0.2315**  0.2382**  0.3358***  0.3330***  0.1286  0.2386** 
  (4.70)  (4.72)  (2.15)  (2.25)  (4.38)  (4.36)  (0.93)  (2.25) 
  0.0888***  0.0889***  0.0609**  0.0627**  0.0862***  0.0854***  0.0329  0.0628** 
  (4.77)  (4.78)  (2.16)  (2.26)  (4.41)  (4.39)  (0.93)  (2.27) 
Constant  1.3991***  1.4100***  -0.5614  -0.4390  1.3057***  1.4135***  -0.2627  -0.4286 
  (4.14)  (4.19)  (-0.90)  (-0.72)  (3.76)  (3.99)  (-0.33)  (-0.70) 
No. Obs.  2,115  2,115  1,103  1,103  1,872  1,872  828  1,103 
LogL  -1032  -1032  -519.3  -519.9  -863.3  -862.4  -379.6  -519.8 
SBIC  2118  2117  1088  1089  1779  1778  806.3  1089 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0193  0.0200  0.0380  0.0370  0.0234  0.0244  0.0347  0.0370 
Notes: For sources, see Table 1. Robust z-statistics for both the estimated coefficients and respective average marginal 
effects are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
SBIC =2[-LogL+(k/2)lnN], where k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. McFadden’s or 
Pseudo-R
2=1-logL/logL0, where logL0 is the log-likelihood computed with only a constant term. 
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Table 4. Regressions with local variables: Pooled probit 
  % changes from the previous year  Average % changes over term 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
PPI  0.0215***  0.0209***  0.0216***  0.0385*  0.0369*  0.0362* 
  (2.61)  (2.63)  (2.68)  (1.89)  (1.84)  (1.71) 
  0.0054***  0.0052***  0.0054***  0.0097*  0.0092*  0.0091* 
  (2.61)  (2.63)  (2.68)  (1.90)  (1.85)  (1.72) 
Wages    -0.0115      0.0529*   
    (-0.84)      (1.68)   
    -0.0029      0.0132*   
    (-0.84)      (1.69)   
Employ      0.0013      -0.0039 
      (0.39)      (-0.45) 
      0.0003      -0.0010 
      (0.39)      (-0.45) 
TotExpd  0.0008***      0.0008***     
  (2.98)      (2.78)     
  0.0002***      0.0002***     
  (3.04)      (2.85)     
CapExpd    0.0014***  0.0013***    0.0014***  0.0013*** 
    (3.30)  (3.24)    (3.26)  (3.22) 
    0.0003***  0.0003***    0.0003***  0.0003*** 
    (3.35)  (3.28)    (3.32)  (3.26) 
LnPop  0.1483*  0.1332*  0.1260*  0.1622*  0.1307*  0.1313* 
  (1.77)  (1.88)  (1.75)  (1.80)  (1.71)  (1.74) 
  0.0371*  0.0332*  0.0314*  0.0407*  0.0327*  0.0329* 
  (1.79)  (1.88)  (1.76)  (1.82)  (1.73)  (1.75) 
SGov  -0.1579  -0.1753  -0.1893*  -0.1644  -0.1864*  -0.1988* 
  (-1.43)  (-1.57)  (-1.67)  (-1.50)  (-1.67)  (-1.77) 
  -0.0395  -0.0437  -0.0471*  -0.0413  -0.0466*  -0.0498* 
  (-1.44)  (-1.58)  (-1.69)  (-1.51)  (-1.69)  (-1.79) 
TLGov  -0.0595***  -0.0577***  -0.0590***  -0.0571**  -0.0585***  -0.0578** 
  (-2.63)  (-2.58)  (-2.59)  (-2.50)  (-2.57)  (-2.52) 
  -0.0149***  -0.0144***  -0.0147***  -0.0143**  -0.0146***  -0.0145*** 
  (-2.68)  (-2.61)  (-2.63)  (-2.54)  (-2.63)  (-2.57) 
MajGov  0.1597  0.1297  0.1427  0.1271  0.1171  0.1270 
  (1.09)  (0.89)  (0.98)  (0.87)  (0.80)  (0.85) 
  0.0399  0.0323  0.0355  0.0319  0.0293  0.0318 
  (1.09)  (0.90)  (0.98)  (0.87)  (0.80)  (0.85) 
Age  -0.0293***  -0.0295***  -0.0271***  -0.0278***  -0.0280***  -0.0257*** 
  (-3.77)  (-3.80)  (-3.35)  (-3.58)  (-3.60)  (-3.21) 
  -0.0073***  -0.0074***  -0.0067***  -0.0070***  -0.0070***  -0.0064*** 
  (-3.79)  (-3.82)  (-3.35)  (-3.61)  (-3.63)  (-3.22) 
Male  -0.3969  -0.3883  -0.4046  -0.4085  -0.4206  -0.4096 
  (-1.21)  (-1.20)  (-1.23)  (-1.26)  (-1.28)  (-1.26) 
  -0.0992  -0.0969  -0.1007  -0.1026  -0.1051  -0.1025 
  (-1.21)  (-1.20)  (-1.23)  (-1.26)  (-1.28)  (-1.26) 
Degree  0.0965  0.1007  0.1092  0.0881  0.0974  0.1032 
  (0.86)  (0.90)  (0.95)  (0.79)  (0.88)  (0.91) 
  0.0241  0.0251  0.0272  0.0221  0.0243  0.0258 
  (0.86)  (0.89)  (0.95)  (0.79)  (0.88)  (0.91) 
Residence  -0.0657  -0.0518  -0.0790  -0.0430  -0.0252  -0.0573 
  (-0.33)  (-0.26)  (-0.39)  (-0.22)  (-0.13)  (-0.29) 
  -0.0164  -0.0129  -0.0197  -0.0108  -0.0063  -0.0143 
  (-0.333)  (-0.26)  (-0.39)  (-0.22)  (-0.13)  (-0.29) 
Constant  0.9002  1.1645  1.1259  0.7181  1.0717  1.0682 
  (0.81)  (1.21)  (1.15)  (0.61)  (1.06)  (1.106) 
No. Obs.  795  795  778  792  792  775 
LogL  -356.6  -355.9  -347.5  -356.4  -354.8  -347.8 
SBIC  786.6  791.9  774.8  786.2  789.7  775.4 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0632  0.0650  0.0640  0.0585  0.0626  0.0577 
Notes: See Table 3. Robust z-statistics for the estimated coefficients and average marginal effects are in 
parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
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